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Tax Avoidance
in the 21st Century
by
David G Duff 1
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of tax avoidance is almost certainly as old as taxation itself. 2
Over the past few decades, however, several factors have contributed to what
numerous revenue agencies and academic authors have characterised as a
significant increase in tax avoidance activity. 3 In response, governments have
adopted various measures, both legislative and administrative, to combat this
phenomenon. 4 Although these reforms appear to have had a noticeable
impact on tax avoidance activity in at least some jurisdictions, 5 it is uncertain
whether they are fully adequate to address the problem of tax avoidance in the
21st century.
This paper considers both the causes of increased tax avoidance activity
over the past several years as well as governmental responses to this
phenomenon in key common law jurisdictions, notably Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The first section
discusses the concept of tax avoidance, distinguishing unacceptable or abusive
tax avoidance both from illegal tax evasion on the one hand and acceptable tax
1 Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia; Fellow, Taxation Law and Policy Research
Institute, Monash University and International Research Fellow, Oxford University Centre
for Business Taxation.
2 See N Tutt, The History of Tax Avoidance (Wisedene, 1989).
3 See, eg, US Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters – Discussion, Analysis and Legislative
Proposals (1999); J Bankman, “The New Corporate Tax Shelters Market” (1999) 83 Tax
Notes 1775; D McBarnet and C Whelen, Creative Accounting and the Cross-Eyed Javelin Thrower
(John Wiley & Sons, 1999); J Braithwaite, Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue (2005); South
African Revenue Service (SARS), Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance (November 2005), p 10;
C Evans, “Barriers to Avoidance: Recent Legislative and Judicial Developments in
Common Law Jurisdictions” (2007) 37 Hong Kong Law Journal 103; and Finance Quebec,
Aggressive Tax Planning (January 2009), p 3.
4 For excellent summaries of these measures, see Finance Quebec, above, n 3.
5 See, eg, D Weisbach, “Comments on Recent Developments on Tax Shelters in the US”, in J
Freedman (ed), Beyond Boundaries: Developing Approaches to Tax Avoidance and Risk Management
(2008), pp 57, 60 (reporting a “consensus that the large-scale retail marketing of tax shelters
has slowed significantly”).
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planning or tax minimisation on the other. This is followed by a consideration
of the causes of recent tax avoidance activity and its adverse effects for
domestic tax systems. Government responses to tax avoidance are then
reviewed, examining both legislative reforms and administrative innovations.
The final section returns to the concept of tax avoidance, questioning whether
these legislative and administrative measures are sufficient to the address the
problem of tax avoidance in the 21st century.
THE CONCEPT OF TAX AVOIDANCE
In a recent article on the Canadian general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR),
Tim Edgar defines tax avoidance “in its broadest (and perhaps most simplistic
sense)” as “any change in behaviour that occurs as a response to the change in
price of particular activities, assets or transactions occasioned by the imposition
of taxation”. 6 From this perspective, he explains, distinctions between tax
avoidance and tax evasion represent “differences in degree rather than
differences in kind” 7 while any distinction between acceptable and abusive tax
avoidance is “hopelessly unclear”. 8
Based as they are on a purely consequentialist and economic understanding
of tax avoidance, these conclusions have limited relevance to the realm of tax
law, which traditionally distinguishes illegal tax evasion from legal but
unacceptable tax avoidance, and unacceptable or abusive tax avoidance from
permissible tax planning or tax minimisation. According to the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for example, tax
“evasion” involves “illegal arrangements through or by means of which
liability to tax is hidden or ignored” as a consequence of which “the taxpayer
pays less tax than he is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or information
from the tax authorities”, while tax “avoidance” constitutes “an arrangement
of a taxpayer’s affairs that is intended to reduce his liability and that although
the arrangement could be strictly legal it is usually in contradiction with the
intent of the law it purports to follow”. 9 In contrast, “tax planning” is defined
as the “[a]rrangement of a person’s business and/or private affairs in order to
minimize tax liability”. 10
6 T Edgar, “Designing and Implementing a Target-Effective General Anti-Avoidance Rule”,
in D Duff and H Erlichman (eds), Tax Avoidance in Canada After Canada Trustco and Mathew
(2007), pp 221, 226. For a similar economic approach to the concept of tax avoidance, on
which Edgar’s approach is based, see M Brooks and J Head, “Tax Avoidance in Economics,
Law and Public Choice”, in G Cooper (ed), Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (1997), p 53.
7 T Edgar, above, n 6, p 233.
8 T Edgar, above, n 6, p 222.
9 OECD, International Tax Terms for the Participants in the OECD Programme of Cooperation with
Non-OECD Economies, online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/21/33967016.pdf (last
accessed 17 February 2009).
10 OECD, above, n 9.
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Tax evasion versus tax avoidance
As Chris Evans explains, the legal distinction between tax evasion and tax
avoidance is “well-recognized” as “the difference between working outside the
law and working within the law (though against its spirit)”. 11 Somewhat more
colourfully, former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey has
described the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion as “the
thickness of a prison wall”. 12
While deliberate concealment is generally understood as the “common
thread” that runs through all cases of tax evasion, 13 the extent of taxpayer
disclosure that is necessary to prevent the ascription of tax evasion is not
always clear. 14 Indeed, to the extent that participation in tax avoidance
schemes encourages taxpayers to be “economical with the truth” 15 it is not
surprising that the line between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion may
become blurred – as John Tiley and Graeme Cooper have noted in different
contexts. 16 While tax authorities may be tempted to encourage this
development in order to deter abusive tax avoidance, 17 an approach more
compatible with rule of law principles and taxpayer certainty involves the
introduction of mandatory disclosure rules and civil penalties for unacceptable
or abusive tax avoidance – two of the most prominent legislative reforms that
common law jurisdictions have either introduced or considered adopting in
response to recent increases in tax avoidance activity. 18
Tax avoidance versus tax minimisation
In contrast to the “well-recognized” distinction between tax evasion and tax
avoidance, the distinction between unacceptable or abusive tax avoidance and
acceptable tax minimisation or tax planning is considerably less clear and often
questioned outright. In McNiven v Westmoreland [2001] STC 257, for example,
Lord Hoffman declared that unless the statutory provisions at issue “contain
words like ‘avoidance’ or ‘mitigation’, I do not think that it helps to introduce
them”. 19 In a similar vein, Judith Freedman has dismissed the “attempt divide
11 C Evans, “Containing Tax Avoidance: Anti-Avoidance Strategies” [2008] University of New
South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 40, p 4.
12 Cited in C Evans, above, n 11.
13 J Freedman, “Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance
Principle” [2004] British Tax Review 332 at 347.
14 J Freedman, above, n 13 at 349.
15 J Freedman, above, n 13 at 349.
16 J Tiley, Revenue Law (4th ed, 2000), p 85; and G Cooper, “Analyzing Corporate Tax
Evasion” (1994) 50 Tax Law Review 33, n 35. See also SARS, above, n 3, p 22, n 68.
17 According to the Chair of Customs and Excise in the UK, for example, “[i]t may be that as
the legal principles of avoidance become defined in case law, a business which implements
an avoidance scheme which has been held by the courts to be avoidance could be
embarking on a course of conduct which amounts to evasion”: R Broadbent, “VAT
Compliance in the 21st Century” [2003] British Tax Review 122 at 128.
18 See below, “Disclosure legislation” and “Penalties for abusive tax avoidance”.
19 [2001] STC 257.
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acceptable avoidance, tax planning or mitigation on the one hand, and
unacceptable avoidance on the other, in any general sense” as “unhelpful”. 20
Although affirming the distinction, Chris Evans observes that it is “generally
recognised as not being as clear as the distinction between avoidance and
evasion”. 21
In the United Kingdom and many Commonwealth jurisdictions, 22 the
challenge of distinguishing between unacceptable or abusive tax avoidance
and acceptable tax planning or mitigation is directly traceable to the traditional
interpretative doctrine that tax statutes must be construed strictly, 23 and to the
judicial principle established in the famousDuke of Westminster case that “[e]very
man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be”. 24 To the extent that tax
statutes are construed literally and tax avoidance is unfettered by law, it is
conceptually impossible to distinguish unacceptable or abusive tax avoidance
from acceptable tax planning or mitigation. Although more recent UK
decisions have clearly abandoned strict construction in favour of a more
purposive approach to the interpretation of tax legislation, UK courts have
remained generally reluctant to embrace broad-based anti-avoidance
doctrines. 25
In contrast to the UK approach, US courts have long been willing to adopt
general anti-avoidance doctrines such as the business purpose test and a
substance over form doctrine. 26 According to the former, tax benefits
otherwise available under the relevant legislation can be denied to taxpayers
who enter into transactions or relationships solely or primarily to obtain tax
benefits not clearly intended by the legislation. 27 According to the latter,
transactions should be characterised for tax purposes according to their
commercial or economic substance, rather than their legal form. 28 While
affirming the “legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them”, 29 therefore, US
20 J Freedman, above, n 13 at 350.
21 C Evans, above, n 11, pp 4-5.
22 See, eg, B Alarie and D Duff, “The Legacy of UK Tax Concepts in Canadian Tax Law”
[2008] British Tax Review 228 at 238-251.
23 See, eg, Partington v Attorney-General (1869) 4 LR 100 (HL) per Lord Cairns at 122, stating
that “if the Crown, seeking to recover tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the
law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might
otherwise appear to be”.
24 IRC v Duke of Westminster, 19 TC 490; [1936] AC 1 at 520 (TC), 19 (AC).
25 See, eg, J Freedman, “Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention of
Parliament” (2007) 122 Law Quarterly Review 52.
26 See, eg, J Bankman, “The Economic Substance Doctrine” (2000) 74 Southern California
Law Review 5.
27 See, eg, Bazley v CIR 331 US 737 (1947); and Goldstein v CIR 364 F2d 734, 2d Cir, (1966)
cert denied 385 US 1005 (1967).
28 See, eg, CIR v Court Holding 324 US 331 (1945); and Waterman Steamship Corporation v CIR
430 F2d 1185 (1970), cert denied 401 US 939 (1971).
29 Gregory v Helvering 293 US 465 (1935) at 469.
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courts have drawn a line between legitimate tax minimisation “by means which
the law permits” 30 and unacceptable or abusive tax avoidance that is
precluded by these judicial doctrines.
Similarly, many Commonwealth jurisdictions have introduced general
anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) which limit the scope of theDuke of Westminster
principle. 31 In Australia, for example, Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA
1936) Pt IVA disallows tax benefits that are derived from a broadly-defined
“scheme” that is entered into for the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining a
tax benefit. 32 In Canada, s 245 of the federal Income Tax Act 1985 (ITA)
disallows tax benefits resulting from tax-motivated transactions that result in a
misuse or abuse of specific statutory provisions or the scheme of the ITA as a
whole. 33 In New Zealand, s BB3(1) of the New Zealand Income Tax Act
(NZITA) authorises the Commissioner to “counteract a tax advantage from a
tax avoidance arrangement” while s OB1 defines a “tax avoidance
arrangement” as an arrangement that has tax avoidance as its purpose or effect
or one of its purposes or effects provided this is not merely incidental. 34 As
the New Zealand Court of Appeal has explained, these GAARs establish a
general standard “by which the line between legitimate tax planning and
improper tax avoidance is to be drawn”. 35
In order to draw this line, it is often considered helpful to identify various
“hallmarks” or “badges” of tax avoidance. 36 According to the South African
Revenue Service (SARS), for example, common attributes of tax avoidance
schemes include:
(1) the lack of economic substance (usually resulting from pre-arranged circular or
self-cancelling arrangements);
(2) the use of tax-indifferent accommodating parties or special purpose entities;
(3) unnecessary steps and complexity;
(4) inconsistent treatment for tax and financial accounting purposes;
30 Gregory v Helvering 293 US 465 (1935) at 469.
31 See, eg, Pt IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Australia); s 245 of the federal Income
Tax Act 1985 (Canada), ss 61 and 61A of the Inland Revenue Ordinance (Hong Kong);
ss BG1 and GB1 of the Income Tax Act 1994 (New Zealand); and s 103 of the Income Tax
Act 1962 (South Africa).
32 For a brief summary of the Australian GAAR, see C Evans, “The Battle Continues:
Recent Australian Experience with Statutory Avoidance and Disclosure Rules”, in J
Freedman, above, n 5, pp 37, 38-41.
33 For a short explanation of the Canadian GAAR, see B Arnold, “The Canadian Experience
with a General Anti-Avoidance Rule” in J Freedman, above, n 5, p 29.
34 For a brief explanation of the New Zealand GAAR, see SARS, above, n 3, pp. 32-35.
35 CIR v BNZ Investments (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103; [2002] 1 NZLR 450 (CA), per
Richardson P. See also Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 14 (explaining that a GAAR
“tempers” the Duke of Westminster principle “by establishing a line between legitimate tax
planning and abusive tax avoidance”).
36 See, eg, SARS, above, n 3, p 19.
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(5) high transaction costs; and
(6) fee variation clauses or contingent fee provisions. 37
Other common characteristics identified by the SARS include significant
marketing activities by promoters, 38 the use of new and complex financial
instruments which allow promoters to “mimic almost perfectly the risks and
returns attributable to more traditional financial instruments” 39, and the use
of tax havens, particularly involving captive insurance companies, captive
finance subsidiaries and intangible property holding companies. 40
Although these attributes or hallmarks can be useful factors for revenue
authorities to take into account when deciding whether or not to subject
transactions and arrangements to closer scrutiny (and are therefore valuable
criteria for the design of disclosure rules considered later in this paper 41), they
themselves do not determine the existence of unacceptable or abusive tax
avoidance nor define the distinction between this concept and acceptable tax
planning or tax minimisation. On the contrary, as numerous commentators
have explained, the essential element of abusive tax avoidance is the acquisition
of a tax benefit that contradicts the scheme and purpose of the statute or the
intent of the legislature. 42 As a result, as Lord Nolan emphasised in CIR v
Willoughby [1997] 4 All ER 65 (at 73):
The hall mark of tax avoidance is that the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax
without incurring the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be
suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for such reduction in his tax liability. The hall
mark of tax mitigation, on the other hand, is that the taxpayer takes advantage
37 SARS, above, n 3, p 19. For a detailed discussion of these attributes, see also, pp 20-25.
38 SARS, above, n 3, p 19, n 61.
39 SARS, above, n 3, pp 25-26.
40 SARS, above, n 3, pp 26-27.
41 See below, “Disclosure legislation”.
42 See, eg, D Weisbach, “Formalism in the Tax Law” (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law
Review 860 at 879-880 (observing that anti-abuse rules apply to “transactions entered into
with a purpose of avoiding the purposes of the statute”); J Bankman, “The Tax Shelter
Battle”, in H Aaron and J Slemrod (eds), The Crisis in Tax Administration (2004), p 9
(defining a tax shelter as “a transaction that (1) is marketed and tax-motivated, (2) succeeds
under at least one literal reading of the governing statute or regulation, (3) misstates
economic income, and (4) in doing so reduces the tax on capital, (5) in a manner inconsistent
with any purposive or intentionalist reading of the statute or regulation” (emphasis added); Review
of Business Taxation, A Tax System Redesigned – More Certain, Equitable and Durable (1999),
section 6.2(c) (explaining that “tax avoidance [is] a mis-use or abuse of the law [that] is
often driven by the exploitation of structural loopholes in the law to achieve tax outcomes
that were not intended by Parliament but also includes the manipulation of the law and a
focus on form and legal effect rather than substance”); SARS, above, n 3, p 4 (defining
“impermissible tax avoidance” as “artificial or contrived arrangements with little or no
actual economic impact upon the taxpayer, that are usually designed to manipulate or
exploit perceived ‘loopholes’ in tax laws in order to achieve results that conflict with or
defeat the intention of Parliament”); D Hariton, “When and How Should the Economic
Substance Doctrine Be Applied” (2006) 60 Tax Law Review 29 at 31 (explaining that the
economic substance doctrine should not be applied to disallow tax benefits “unless they
are clearly inconsistent with tax policy and congressional intent”).
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of a fiscally attractive option afforded to him by the legislation, and genuinely
suffers the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by
those taking advantage of the option.
Since the scheme and purpose of the relevant tax legislation is often difficult
to discern and legislative intent is often unclear, it is not surprising that the line
between unacceptable of abusive tax avoidance and acceptable tax planning or
tax minimisation can be difficult to draw in practice. To the extent that tax
statutes recognise and permit artificial sale-leaseback transactions, for example,
it is perhaps understandable that courts in different jurisdictions have found it
difficult to conclude that even highly artificial transactions designed to obtain
capital or depreciation allowances do not constitute abusive tax avoidance. 43
As Judith Freedman explains, “the capital allowance legislation is quite
deliberately not based on economic reality so that government cannot
complain when the leasing industry uses the regime to the full, absent any
indication that it should not have the advantage of capital allowances in these
circumstances”. 44
The challenge of gauging abusive tax avoidance is even more acute in the
international arena, where the tax consequences of transactions and
arrangements are governed by the interaction of different domestic tax laws as
well as bilateral tax treaties, and the contours and very existence of an
international tax regime is a matter of ongoing debate. 45 As a result, it is
perhaps not surprising that courts have been unwilling to apply the Canadian
GAAR to tax-motivated transactions designed to take advantage of Canada’s
tax treaty network, 46 and equally unsurprising that responses to international
tax arbitrage – to the extent that these have been pursued at all – have taken the
form of specific anti-avoidance measures and amendments to bilateral tax
treaties rather than judicial remedies under domestic anti-avoidance doctrines
or GAARs. 47
43 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2005] 1 AC 684; [2005] STC 1; [2004]
UKHL 51; Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SCC 54; Peterson v CIR [2005]
STC 448. For helpful reflections on these decisions, see J Freedman, “Converging Tracks?
Recent Developments in Canadian and UK Approaches to Tax Avoidance” (2005) 53
Canadian Tax Journal 1038; M Gammie, “Barclays and Canada Trustco: Further Comment
from a UK Perspective” (2005) 53 Canadian Tax Journal 1047; and M Littlewood, “The
Privy Council and the Australasian Anti-Avoidance Rules” [2007] British Tax Review 175.
44 J Freedman, above, n 13 at 351-352.
45 See, eg, H Rosenbloom, “International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax
System”” (2000) 53 Tax Law Review 137 (dismissing the idea of an “international tax
system” as “imaginary” and questioning the introduction of domestic tax rules to prevent
international tax arbitrage); and R Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An
Analysis of the International Tax Regime (2007) (affirming the existence of an international
tax regime as a creature of customary international law and welcoming the adoption of
anti-tax-arbitrage rules as a manifestation of this regime).
46 MIL Investments (SA) v The Queen [2006] 5 CTC 2552; 2006 DTC 3307 (TCC), aff’d 2007
FCA 23; and Prévost Car v The Queen [2008] 5 CTC 2306; 2008 DTC 3080 (TCC), aff ’d
[2009] FCA 57; 2009 DTC 5053.
47 See, eg, M Boyle, “Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage – Policy Choices and Political Motivations”
[2005] British Tax Review 527.
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CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF TAX AVOIDANCE
As explained in the introduction to this paper, the extent of abusive tax
avoidance activity has increased significantly over the past few decades, causing
governments to adopt various responses to what is widely regarded as a
“growing problem”. 48 In order to assess these responses, it is helpful to
consider the causes of recent increases tax avoidance activity as well as the
adverse effects of increased tax avoidance that have motivated governments to
respond.
Causes of tax avoidance
According to the South African Revenue Service, impermissible tax
avoidance typically involves the pursuit of four basic goals:
(1) the deferral of a tax liability;
(2) the conversion of the character of an item (for example from revenue to capital
or, in more aggressive products, the conversion of a taxable item such as interest
to a tax-exempt one such as dividends);
(3) the permanent elimination of a tax liability; and/or
(4) the shifting of income (for example, from a taxpayer subject to the highest
marginal rates to a taxpayer subject to a lower (or zero) rate of tax). 49
As Chris Evans explains, “[a]chievement of any or all of these goals is only
possible because of the potential for tax leverage or tax arbitrage that arises as
a result of so-called inconsistencies and discontinuities that exist within
national tax jurisdictions and across international tax borders”. 50 While one
might hope to minimise opportunities for tax avoidance by reforming basic tax
rules to eliminate or reduce these inconsistencies and discontinuities, they
often exist for good reasons (for example to reduce complexity, to
accommodate liquidity concerns, to promote social and economic policy
objectives, or to recognise national sovereignty) and are unlikely to disappear. 51
As a result, although amendments to what John Braithwaite has characterised
as “loophole-ridden tax laws” are an important way to prevent opportunities
for abusive tax avoidance, 52 it is also essential to regulate the manipulation of
these inconsistencies and discontinuities in order to address this problem.
In recent years, several factors have made it increasingly difficult for
domestic tax authorities to carry out this regulatory function. First, as Vito
Tanzi argues, globalisation and technological innovation have created a
number of “fiscal termites” which are likely to impair each country’s ability to
48 SARS, above, n 3, p 7. See also Finance Quebec, above, n 3, pp 8-9 (referring to a
“proliferation” of abusive tax avoidance schemes in recent years).
49 SARS, above, n 3, p 16.
50 C Evans, above, n 11, pp 6-7.
51 C Evans, above, n 11, p 7.
52 J Braithwaite, above, n 3, p 21.
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collect taxes. 53 Second, as John Braithwaite explains, these “fiscal termites”
have facilitated the proliferation of “moral termites” who exploit these
opportunities to lessen the taxes that they or their clients pay. 54 Third, judicial
decisions in several jurisdictions accepting the legitimacy of aggressive tax
planning and affirming a more literal approach to the interpretation of tax
statutes have encouraged this development, 55 fostering more accepting
attitudes among tax advisors and their clients toward tax avoidance. 56
According to a recent paper issued by the Finance Department of the
Province of Quebec, the recent growth in the market for what it calls
aggressive tax planning (ATP) has been driven by increases both in the
demand for and supply of ATP schemes. 57 On the one hand, it explains:
The development of communication technologies and electronic finance, the
introduction of innovative financial products and the global integration of
national economies … have led to greater competition among businesses as well
as a greater need for them to control their costs, including their tax costs, which
usually represent a significant expense item. 58
In turn, it continues:
This need among businesses … fostered the expansion of firms of tax
intermediaries – lawyers, accountants, investment banks, in particular – and the
development among the latter of an advanced knowledge of various tax regimes
as well as sophisticated expertise for integrated management of their clients’ tax
situation on a global basis. 59
In addition, it observes, “[t]he highly competitive market for tax consulting
services fuelled the appetite of taxpayers to further reduce their tax costs and
encouraged advisors to design ATP schemes”, 60 leading to “the development
of a new business model based on designing and distributing off-the-shelf tax
53 V Tanzi, “Globalization and the Work of Fiscal Termites” IMF Working Paper, WP/00/
181 (November 2000) (identifying the following eight “fiscal termites”: (1) electronic
commerce and transactions; (2) the use of electronic money; (3) intra-company trade; (4)
offshore financial centres and tax havens; (5) derivatives and hedge funds; (6) inability to
tax highly mobile financial capital; (7) growing foreign activities by highly skilled
individuals; and (8) foreign shopping).
54 J Braithwaite, above, n 3, pp 25-26.
55 See, eg, A Freiberg, “Ripples from the Bottom of the Harbour: Some Social Ramifications
of Taxation Fraud” (1988) 12 Criminal Law Journal 136; and Finance Quebec, above, n 3,
pp 12-18. On the shift in Supreme Court of Canada tax jurisprudence during the 1990s,
see D Duff, “Justice Iacobucci and the “Golden and Straight Metwand” of Canadian Tax
Law” (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 525.
56 US Department of Treasury, above, n 3, (1999) p 19.
57 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 9.
58 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 9.
59 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 9. See also SARS, above, n 3, pp 8-9 (noting that “the
lucrative market for tax avoidance schemes and ‘tax optimisation’ plans has led to an
increase in the resources and talent being devoted to those areas by professional firms in
many countries” while advances in computer and telecommunication technology have
“radically transformed the way in which multinational firms, particularly multinational
accounting firms, can share and exchange information” increasing the speed with which
tax avoidance schemes can migrate to different jurisdictions).
60 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 9.
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products”. 61 In this respect, as Braithwaite concludes, the growing market for
aggressive tax planning (particularly involving international tax arbitrage) has
been driven as much or more by the supply of tax avoidance schemes as by the
demand for these arrangements. 62
Consequences of tax avoidance
While the causes of recent increases in tax avoidance activity are still subject
to some debate, 63 the consequences of tax avoidance are relatively
uncontroversial. As the South African Revenue Service explains:
The harms caused by impermissible tax avoidance are varied and pervasive.
They include short-term revenue loss, growing disrespect for the tax system and
the law, increasingly complex legislation, the uneconomic allocation of resources,
an unfair shifting of the tax burden, and a weakening of the ability of
Parliament and the National Treasury to set and implement economic policy. 64
Beginning with short-term revenue losses, it is difficult to accurately estimate
the size of the problem, since much tax avoidance goes undetected. 65
According to Finance Quebec, however, the revenue losses from various ATP
schemes that were foreclosed by provincial amendments over the last several
years would have amounted to roughly half a billion dollars in Quebec
alone. 66 At the federal level in Canada, recent administrative efforts to
counteract aggressive tax planning are estimated to have yielded $1.4 billion in
additional identified taxes for a single taxation year. 67 As a result, as the
Quebec Finance Department concludes, it seems clear that ATP has “a
negative impact on public finances and that the impact is substantial”. 68
In addition, as the OECD emphasises, tax avoidance is “economically
costly”. 69 As the South African Revenue Service observes:
impermissible tax avoidance creates significant deadweight losses for the
economy by distorting trade and investment flows. In particular, avoidance
schemes often involve a re- or misallocation of resources from productive
61 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, pp 2 and 11-12 (explaining that ATP has become “a new
specialty in the field of taxation” involving a new business model in which tax
intermediaries refine “tax ideas” for target client groups and market “off-the-shelf tax
products” that are typically sold in return for remuneration that is “conditional and
proportional to the tax that is avoided”). See also J Braithwaite, above, n 3, p 118 (relating
one New York tax advisor’s comment that “[i]nstead of a client looking for a transaction
to solve their tax problem, we have transactions looking for clients”).
62 J Braithwaite, above, n 3, pp 51-57.
63 See, eg, J Braithwaite, above, n 3, pp 117-118 (relating alternative views on whether the
growing market in aggressive tax planning is driven mostly on the demand-side or the
supply-side).
64 SARS, above, n 3, p 9.
65 SARS, above, n 3, p 9.
66 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 20.
67 Canada Revenue Agency, 2006-2007 Canada Revenue Agency Annual Report, p 59.
68 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 21.
69 OECD, “Forces Shaping Tax Policy” (June 1998), 63 OECD Economic Outlook 165.
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investments to activities that are, at best, marginally profitable on a pre-tax basis.
These distortions reduce economic efficiency and impede growth. 70
As well, it explains, “[a]dditional costs are reflected in the resources that are
diverted from productive investment to the development, marketing,
implementation and subsequent defence of impermissible tax avoidance
schemes”. 71
Furthermore, it seems, tax avoidance generally increases the complexity of
tax legislation, as legislatures almost invariably respond by enacting specific
anti-avoidance measures designed to prevent specific schemes that are
discovered on audit as well as through more detailed and complex drafting
intended to pre-empt opportunities for tax avoidance in the first place. 72 To
the extent that tax avoidance increases the complexity of tax legislation,
moreover, it also adds to the costs of tax avoidance as compliance and
administrative costs increase for taxpayers and revenue authorities. 73
More importantly, perhaps, abusive tax avoidance results in an unfair
shifting of the tax burden, particularly to less mobile factors like labour and
consumption. 74 As the Quebec Finance Department notes:
Since ATP is usually associated with high-income taxpayers who can afford
sophisticated professional services, the proliferation of ATP schemes raises
serious issues of fairness among taxpayers.
If the government wants to maintain a balanced budget, it will nonetheless have
to collect, from other taxpayers, the tax revenue lost through ATP which directly
violates one of the principles of our social organization, ie that everyone
participates in funding the state on the basis of his ability to contribute. 75
Finally and perhaps most significantly, abusive tax avoidance has what even the
Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association has labelled a “corrosive
effect” on the integrity of the tax system – breeding “significant disrespect for
the tax system” and “encouraging responsible corporate taxpayers to expect
this type of activity to be the norm, and to follow the lead of other taxpayers
who have engaged in tax advantaged transactions”. 76
70 SARS, above, n 3, p 12, citing P Groenewegen, “Distributional and Allocational Effects of
Tax Avoidance”, in D Collins (ed), Tax Avoidance and the Economy (Australian Tax Research
Foundation, 1984), p 23.
71 SARS, above, n 3, pp 11-12, citing J Slemrod and S Yitzhaki, “The Costs of Taxation and
the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds” (March 1996) 43 IMF Staff Papers 172.
72 SARS, above, n 3, p 11.
73 SARS, above, n 3, p 11.
74 See, eg, R Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State” (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 1575 at 1578.
75 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 21.
76 Statement of Harold R Handler, on behalf of the Tax Section, New York State Bar
Association, before the Committee on Finance (27 April 1999), cited in US Treasury,
above, n 3, p 3.
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As the Quebec Finance Department explains:
Like a vicious circle, the perceived unfairness and injustice in such a system are
such as to discourage … taxpayers to comply with the law, and consequently,
increase the changes of damaging the integrity of the system. 77
As a result, abusive tax avoidance can undermine the integrity of self-
assessment tax systems that John Braithwaite has eloquently described as “the
remarkable 20th century accomplishment” of common law countries like
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United
States. 78
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO TAX AVOIDANCE
As tax avoidance activity has increased over the past few decades,
governments have adopted various measures, both legislative and
administrative, to discourage this phenomenon. In order to reduce the demand
for aggressive tax planning, for example, governments have endeavoured to
“alter the current risk/reward ratio” for taxpayers engaging in abusive tax
avoidance, 79 enacting legislation providing for the disclosure of various tax
avoidance arrangements, legislation extending the limitation period for
reassessing tax avoidance transactions, legislation introducing or enhancing
specific and general anti-avoidance rules (SAARs and GAARs), and legislation
imposing penalties for abusive tax avoidance. In order to reduce the supply of
“off-the-shelf” tax avoidance schemes, governments have also enacted
legislation imposing penalties on the promoters of these schemes. In addition
to these legislative initiatives, governments have also initiated administrative
reforms to better target abusive tax avoidance.
Disclosure legislation
In 1984, the United States became the first major country to introduce a
registration system for tax avoidance schemes, requiring promoters of
potentially abusive tax shelters to register these shelters and maintain a list of
persons investing in these shelters. 80 Canada introduced similar tax shelter
registration rules in 1987, 81 and the UK followed their lead in 2004. 82 While
neither Australia nor New Zealand has introduced similar disclosure rules,
Chris Evans suggests that “it is a matter of some speculation as to whether it is
77 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 21.
78 J Braithwaite, above, n 3, pp 31-32.
79 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 2.
80 For a brief description of these disclosure rules, see D Weisbach, above, n 5.
81 For a detailed explanation of these rules, see R Wertschek and J Wilson, “Shelter from the
Storm: The Current State of the Tax Shelter Rules in Section 237.1” (2008) 56 Canadian
Tax Journal 285.
82 C Evans, above, n 11, p 26.
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merely a question of time before the revenue authorities in those countries
manage to persuade their political masters of the absolute necessity for such
wide-reaching provisions”. 83
According to the current US rules, which have been broadened considerably
in recent years, taxpayers who participate in reportable transactions as well as
material advisors who assist in the organisation, management, promotion, sale
or implementation of reportable transactions must disclose these transactions
in information returns submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 84 For
the purpose of these rules, reportable transactions include: “listed
transactions” identified by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); confidential
transactions offered by an advisor under conditions of confidentiality for a
fee; transactions with contractual protection, for which fees are contingent on
the realisation of tax benefits from the transaction; loss transactions resulting
in losses above stipulated dollar amounts; and “transactions of interest” which
are the same or substantially similar to transactions identified by the IRS.
Taxpayers and material advisors who fail to file these information returns may
be subject to substantial penalties ranging from $10,000 to $200,000 plus in the
case of taxpayers a percentage of the understated amount of tax.
According to the current UK rules, which have also been expanded since
their introduction, promoters (and in certain circumstances users) of
“hallmarked” schemes are required to disclose information about “tax
arrangements” that enable or could enable a person to obtain a tax benefit,
where the tax benefit is the main benefit or one of the main benefits arising
from the arrangement. 85 For the purpose of these rules, “hallmarked”
schemes include: (1) arrangements which the promoter might reasonably be
expected to require the user to keep confidential in order to facilitate repeated
use; (2) arrangements from which the tax advantages are expected to be
obtained from the inclusion of a financial product in which the promoter or a
person connected with the promoter becomes a party where the price of the
financial product differs significantly from similar financial products in the
open market; (3) arrangements that are standardised tax products; (4)
arrangements implemented by a promoter for more than one individual, the
main purpose of which can reasonably be regarded as the provision of
deductible losses; (5) arrangements for which it might reasonably be expected
that the promoter or a person connected with the promoter could obtain a
premium fee attributable to the tax advantage or contingent on the user
obtaining the tax advantage; (6) arrangements related to certain high value
plant or machinery leases involving a tax-exempt party, the removal of risk, or
83 C Evans, above, n 11, p 28. In Germany, the Ministry of Finance has proposed statutory
disclosure rules along the lines of those in the US and the UK, but these have yet to be
enacted. See W Schön, “Statutory Avoidance and Disclosure Rules in Germany”, in J
Freedman, above, n 5, p 47.
84 This summary of the US rules is based on the description in Finance Quebec, above, n 3,
pp 60-63.
85 This summary of the UK rules is based on the description in Finance Quebec, above, n 3,
pp 63-67.
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a sale-leaseback or lease and finance leaseback; and (7) in-house schemes,
where there is no promoter, that are intended for use by large enterprises
which seek confidentiality from the tax administration in order to facilitate
repeated or continued use. 86Where the promoter or taxpayer does not file the
required return within time periods stipulated in the legislation (five days for
promoters following the day the arrangement is available for implementation
by another person, 30 days following the first transaction carried out by users
of arrangements implemented for their own use), they may be subject to
penalties starting at £5,000 and increasing by £600 for each day the return is
not filed after the initial penalty is applied.
As Braithwaite explains, “disclosure is the first line of defence against
aggressive tax planning” 87 – allowing revenue authorities to concentrate
scarce resources on tax arrangements that are most likely to involve abusive tax
avoidance. In the UK, for example, Evans notes that the new disclosure rules
have “provided HMRC with unparalleled access to real-time intelligence that
has enabled it to move swiftly to legislate against avoidance activity deemed to
be a threat to the revenue base”. 88 Indeed, the introduction in the UK in 2005
of anti-avoidance rules targeting cross-border tax arbitrage has been attributed,
in part at least, to the introduction only the year before of disclosure rules that
revealed “the number, scope and variety of such schemes”. 89
Between the US rules and the UK rules, however, the Quebec Finance
Department maintains a strong preference for the former, noting that the
requirement of a predominant tax benefit in the UK rules “leaves more room
for interpretation, with the potential for disputes on the existence of such a tax
benefit and uncertainty concerning whether or not early disclosure is
required”. 90 For this reason, it is perhaps not surprising that tax professionals
in the UK appear to have accepted the disclosure regime after initial
“widespread concern”. 91
Limitation periods
As a general rule, revenue authorities have only a limited period of time to
reassess taxpayers before the tax consequences for the relevant taxation year
become statute barred. 92 As a result, as the Quebec Finance Department
86 For a detailed discussion of this “hallmarking” approach, see R Bland, “Hallmarks and the
Direct Tax Disclosure Regime” [2006] British Tax Review 653.
87 J Braithwaite, above, n 3, p 131.
88 C Evans, above, n 11, p 27.
89 M Boyle, above, n 48 at 536.
90 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 78.
91 C Evans, above, n 11, p 27. See also J Tiley, “The Avoidance Problem: Some UK
Reflections” in J Freedman, above, n 5, p 67.
92 In Canada, for example, this limitation period is generally three or four years from the date
that the first notice of assessment is sent to the taxpayer.
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observes, “the passage of time works in favour of the taxpayer and can
influence his decision to participate in an ATP scheme”. 93
In several countries, however, the limitation period for reassessments is
extended where taxpayers have engaged in tax avoidance transactions. In this
circumstance, for example, Australian rules extend the limitation period for
individuals who do not carry on a business and for individuals carrying on a
small business from two years to four years. 94 In Ireland, the tax administration
can issue an opinion on a tax avoidance transaction at any time, unless the
taxpayer provides a protective notification identifying the transaction as a
possible tax avoidance transaction within 90 days. 95
Given the challenges that revenue authorities face both detecting and
assessing complex tax avoidance transactions, an extended limitation period
seems like a reasonable measure to alter the risk/reward ratio for abusive tax
avoidance. As the Quebec Finance Department explains:
What characterizes these transactions is the complexity of the legal structures
on which they are based. In addition, the Minister of Revenue’s task is made
more difficult since he must detect these transactions within a self-assessment
system. Accordingly, the Minister can only become aware of these transactions
as a result of a thorough examination of the tax return filed by the taxpayer. 96
For these reasons, the Department recommends that the limitation period to
reassess transactions subject to the provincial GAAR should be extended from
three to four years to six to seven years. 97 For taxpayers who fail to file a
prescribed form disclosing confidential transactions and transactions with
conditional remuneration, the Department proposes that the limitation period
should commence only when the prescribed form is filed. 98 Whether these
proposals are enacted into law remains to be seen.
SAARs and GAARs
In addition to disclosure rules and limitation period changes, governments
have also endeavoured to combat abusive tax avoidance through specific
anti-avoidance rules (SAARs) and general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs).
According to Chris Evans, the former constitute “smart bombs” in the war
against abusive tax avoidance, while the latter represent “weapons of mass
destruction”. 99
93 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 10.
94 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 70.
95 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, pp 74-75.
96 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 93.
97 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 93.
98 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 83.
99 C Evans, above, n 11, p 32, citing as his inspiration for this analogy A Halkyard, “Not a
Weapon of Mass Destruction: Can the Ramsay Approach Apply to the Inland Revenue
Ordinance in Hong Kong?” (2005) 9 Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation 56. See also C Evans,
above, n 32.
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The advantages and disadvantages of SAARs are well known and nicely
summarised by the Quebec Finance Department. 100On the one hand, SAARs
tend to have a clearly defined field of application, contributing “an element of
certainty” to tax legislation and “foster[ing] a better understanding of the
object, spirit and purpose of the legislation”. 101 On the other hand, because
they apply only to “stipulated or suspected” transactions and are almost never
retroactive in application, they “cannot prevent avoidance transactions not
previously detected”. 102 In addition, as Evans observes, they can also
“contribute … enormously to the length and complexity of … tax …
legislation” and “can lead to legislative layering, which can itself facilitate more
avoidance possibilities (what Lord Walker has referred to as ‘avoidance
karate’)”. 103
Notwithstanding their deficiencies, however, and presumably because of
their advantages, countries continue to rely on SAARs to counteract abusive
tax avoidance schemes, and may have actually increased their use of these
measures as a result of the “boost to real time intelligence” created by the
enactment of disclosure regimes. 104 This is particularly the case in the United
Kingdom which, alone among developed common law countries, has yet to
adopt general anti-avoidance doctrines or a statutory GAAR. 105
In rare circumstances, moreover some jurisdictions have bypassed one of
the main deficiencies of most SAARs, by enacting retroactive amendments to
invalidate tax benefits from abusive tax avoidance arrangements. Although
retroactive legislation is generally denounced as unfair and contrary to the rule
of law, 106 the Quebec Finance Department contends that this approach may
be justified in exceptional circumstances, “for example, where taxpayers try to
take advantage of a weakness or ambiguity in the legislation to develop
schemes considered abusive because they are clearly contrary to the objectives
of fiscal policy”. 107 Similarly at the federal level in Canada, the Department of
Finance is prepared to implement retroactive clarifying legislation in
“exceptional situations” where:
• the amendments reflect a long-standing well-known interpretation of the law
by the Department of National Revenue (now the Canada Revenue Agency);
• the amendments reflect a policy that is clear from the relevant provisions that
is well-known and understood by taxpayers;
100 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 28.
101 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 28.
102 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 28.
103 C Evans, above, n 32, p 43, citing Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, “Ramsay 25 Years On:
Some Reflections on Tax Avoidance” (2004) 120 Law Quarterly Review 412 at 416.
104 C Evans, above, n 11, p 15. See also M Boyle, above, n 48 at 536.
105 C Evans, above, n 11, p 23.
106 See, eg, T McDonnell, “Retroactivity: Policy and Practice”, in Canadian Tax Foundation,
2006 Conference Report (2007), 2:1-33.
107 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 51.
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• the amendments are intended to prevent a windfall benefit to certain
taxpayers;
• the amendments are necessary to preserve the stability of the Government’s
revenue base; [or]
• the amendments are corrections of ambiguous or deficient provisions that
were not in accordance with the object of the Act. 108
As a result, it seems, SAARs (generally proactive and occasionally
retroactive) are certain to play a continuing role in the tax laws of most
common law countries.
As a supplement to specific statutory rules and SAARs, many
Commonwealth countries have also found it useful to introduce statutory
GAARs to discourage abusive tax avoidance. As Stanley Surrey argued
40 years ago, the enactment of general anti-abuse provisions along these lines
saves the tax system from “the far greater proliferation of detail that would be
necessary if the tax avoider could succeed merely by bringing his scheme
within the literal language of substantive provisions written to govern the
everyday world”. 109 To the extent that inconsistencies and discontinuities
inherent in detailed tax rules create unforeseen and often unforeseeable
opportunities to avoid tax consequences compatible with the purposes of the
statute and legislative intent, a general standard like a GAAR can be a more
effective and economical way to prevent abusive tax avoidance than specific
rules and statutory SAARs. 110 For this reason, it is not surprising that most
Commonwealth countries have enacted statutoryGAARs and several countries
have amended these GAARs in order to make them more effective. 111
In assessing the effectiveness of these GAARs, it is useful to recognise their
limited role as provisions of last resort that are designed to prevent abusive tax
avoidance only when ordinary tax rules and SAARs fail to prevent a tax benefit
that is incompatible with the object and purpose of the relevant provision or
statutory scheme. For this reason, one can sympathise with the view of at least
one commentator that the Australian GAAR (which does not include language
limiting its application to abusive transactions) “is drafted so widely as to be
capable of enabling the Commissioner to annihilate any transaction which
provides a tax advantage”. 112
One should also appreciate that judicial cultures change gradually, so that
judges who are steeped in theDuke of Westminster principle may be slow to give
full effect to a newly-enacted GAAR, like the statutory provision introduced in
108 Canada, Comprehensive response of the government to the seventh Report of the Standing Committee
on Public Accounts, parliamentary document no 8512-351-79 (18 September 1995), cited in
Finance Quebec, above, n 3, pp 54-55.
109 S Surrey, “Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management
of Tax Detail” (1969) 34 Law & Contemporary Problems 673 at 707, n 32.
110 See, eg, D Weisbach, above, n 42.
111 See, eg, C Evans, above, n 11, pp 23-24.
112 M Cashmere, “Towards an Appropriate Interpretive Approach to Australia’s General
Tax Avoidance Rule – Part IVA” (2006) 35 Australian Tax Review 231.
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Canada in 1988. For this reason, Brian Arnold’s fear that early Canadian
GAAR decisions “will inexorably render the rule largely ineffective” 113 was
unduly pessimistic – as illustrated by subsequent Supreme Court of Canada
decisions in which the GAAR has been applied. 114
Finally, it is important to recall that a GAAR can operate effectively to
distinguish abusive tax avoidance and acceptable tax planning or tax
minimisation only where the object or purpose of the relevant tax legislation is
reasonably clear, and that this task is made particularly difficult by the
multitude of detailed statutory rules that characterise the tax statutes of most
common law jurisdictions. For this reason, as Judith Freedman has emphasised,
the effectiveness of a statutory GAAR may depend on the introduction of
principles-based legislation as a complement to detailed statutory rules, as
much as it does on the actual design of the GAAR itself. 115 In the United
Kingdom, however, recent initiatives to introduce more principles-based
drafting appear to be an alternative to a GAAR more than a complement. 116
As these initiatives have yet to yield actual legislation, however, it is too early to
assess their merits. 117
Penalties for abusive tax avoidance
Alongside other measures to discourage aggressive tax planning, some
countries impose penalties where the GAAR is successfully applied to disallow
a tax benefit. In Australia, for example, taxpayers may be subject to a penalty of
50% of the amount of the income tax attributable to this tax benefit, or 25%
of the amount of tax if it is reasonably arguable that the GAAR might not
have applied. 118 Similarly, in New Zealand, taxpayers who engage in abusive
transactions that are subject to the GAAR are liable for a penalty up to 100%
of the resulting tax shortfall, though this percentage is reduced for taxpayers
who make voluntary disclosures and taxpayers who have not been subject to a
penalty within the last four years. 119 A penalty on abusive tax avoidance is also
113 B Arnold, “The Long, Slow Steady Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule” (2004)
52 Canadian Tax Journal 488.
114 Mathew v Canada [2005] 2 SCR 643; Lipson v Canada, 2009 SCC 1.
115 J Freedman, above, n 25 at 73. See also J Braithwaite, above, n 3, p 149 (suggesting that a
“hybrid of rules and principles would actually put the brakes on economically wasteful
legal entrepreneurship to manipulate the rules. It is a strategy for reaping the benefits of
rules – clear guidance to taxpayers in common situations – while limiting their
pathologies: exponential growth in legal complexity, burgeoning compliance costs,
expanding waste of private and public resources on legal game playing and countering it,
a tax system that ordinary people cannot comprehend and therefore has low legitimacy
and reduced prospects of voluntary compliance”).
116 HM Treasury and HMRC, Principles-based Approach to Financial Products Avoidance: A
Consultation Document (December 2007).
117 C Evans, above, n 11, p 30.
118 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 69 (adding that this penalty can be increased or decreased
in various circumstances, and can be waived at the discretion of the tax administration).
119 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, pp 72-73.
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imposed under the Irish GAAR, 120 but is not included in the Canadian
GAAR. In Quebec, however, the Department of Finance has indicated that
“[i]ntroduction of a penalty contingent on the application of the [provincial]
GAAR is under consideration”. 121 To the extent that such a penalty alters the
current risk/reward ratio that encourages aggressive tax planning, it seems like
a reasonable reform. 122
Promoter penalties
To the extent that the market for aggressive tax planning is driven as much
or more by the supply of tax avoidance schemes as it is by the demand for
these schemes, it is often argued that penalties should be imposed on the
promoters of these schemes as well as their users. 123 For this reason, Australia
introduced a new system of penalties, which became effective on 6 April 2006,
imposed on promoters of “tax exploitation” schemes. 124
According to these rules, promoter penalties may be imposed where an
entity or natural person either engages in conduct resulting in it or another
entity or natural person being a promoter of a tax exploitation scheme or
engages in conduct that results in a scheme that has been promoted on the
basis of conformity with a product ruling being implemented in a manner that
is materially different from that described in the product ruling. For the
purpose of these rules, a promoter is generally defined to include entities and
natural persons who either market or encourage tax exploitation schemes,
receive consideration in respect of this marketing or encouragement, or have a
substantial role in this marketing or encouragement, and a tax scheme is
generally defined as a tax exploitation scheme “if it is reasonable to conclude
that the entity implementing the scheme does so for the sole or main purpose
of obtaining a tax benefit and it cannot reasonably be maintained that such a
benefit can be obtained under the tax legislation”. 125
Where an entity or natural person is determined to be a promoter of a tax
exploitation scheme, the Australian rules contemplate three possible
consequences. First, the tax administration can accept a voluntary undertaking
from promoters who are willing to provide a full statement regarding their
promotion activities, to cease these activities, and to reimburse participants in
the scheme. Second, where the tax administration concludes that there is little
likelihood that the promoter will honour such an undertaking in view of the
promoter’s past compliance behaviour or promotion of other schemes, it may
120 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 74.
121 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 96.
122 Although taxpayers reassessed under the GAAR may be required to pay interest on
overdue amounts if tax benefits are eventually denied, these interest expenses are at least
partly offset by the additional income that the taxpayer may be able to earn during the
interim as a result of the initial tax saving: Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 10.
123 See, eg, J Braithwaite, above, n 3, p 182.
124 The following summary is based on the descriptions in C Evans, above, n 32, pp 43-44,
and Finance Quebec, above, n 3, pp70-71.
125 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 71.
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ask the Federal Court to issue an injunction to halt the implementation or
promotion of the scheme or remedy an apparent violation of the law. Finally,
the tax administration can ask the Federal Court to impose a civil penalty up to
a maximum amount equal to the greater of 5,000 penalty units (currently
$550,000) for individuals or 25,000 penalty units (currently $2.75 million) for
corporate entities, and twice the amount received or receivable by the
promoter from the tax exploitation scheme. In selecting an appropriate
penalty, the Federal Court can have regard to all matters that it considers
relevant, including the loss or damage incurred by scheme participants and the
honesty and deliberateness of the promoter’s conduct.
Although some commentators have expressed serious reservations about
the potential impact of these rules on tax advisors providing tax planning
advice, 126 the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the new rules
explains that the civil penalty regime is not intended to inhibit the provision of
independent and objective advice, including advice regarding tax planning. 127
Recognising the extent to which the growing market for aggressive tax
planning has been driven by the supply of these schemes, it is not surprising
that other jurisdictions have either followed or are considering following the
Australian example. In New Zealand, for example, promoters of tax avoidance
arrangements are subject to penalties where they offer, sell or promote an
arrangement to 10 or more people in a taxation year and this arrangement
constitutes an abusive tax position, 128 and the Quebec Finance Department is
actively considering the introduction of promoter penalty rules in the Province
of Quebec which would be contingent on the application of the provincial
GAAR. 129 Other jurisdictions can be expected to follow these developments
with keen interest.
Administrative responses
A final set of government measures to counteract abusive tax avoidance
includes administrative initiatives that are designed to better target limited
regulatory resources on the detection and prosecution of the most abusive tax
avoidance schemes. Reflecting the more flexible and innovative regulatory
strategies associated with theories of “responsive regulation”, 130 these
measures are premised on the concept of a “regulatory pyramid” comprising a
range of regulatory responses escalating from the least intrusive for the
126 See, eg, J King, “New Measures Deterring the Promotion of Tax Exploitation Schemes”
(2006) 35 Australian Tax Review 163, cited in C Evans, above, n 32, p 44.
127 Paragraph 3.50 of the Explanatory Memorandum to Tax Laws Amendment (2006 Measures
No 1) Act 2006, cited in C Evans, above, n 32, p 44.
128 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, p 73.
129 Finance Quebec, above, n 3, pp 96-102.
130 See, eg, I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate
(1992); and J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002). For a recent
symposium on responsive regulation and taxation, see (2007) 20 Law & Policy 1-158.
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majority of complying taxpayers at the bottom of the pyramid to the most
intrusive for a minority of consistent non-compliers at the top of the
pyramid. 131
In the UK, for example, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) has
adopted a twofold approach toward the regulation of large businesses, seeking
to facilitate tax compliance on the one hand by reducing complexity, increasing
communication, clarity and certainty, and providing for the speedy resolution
of contentious tax issues (thereby “making it as easy as possible for business to
get their tax affairs right” and “helping them to meet their obligations” 132),
while simultaneously “deal[ing] firmly with those who intentionally fail to meet
their responsibilities” 133 through a risk-based approach to tax administration
that will direct increased resources to high-risk businesses including those
which do not adequately manage their “tax compliance risks” or “repeatedly
push … at the boundary of the law”. 134
Consistent with this regulatory strategy, HMRC has established an Anti-
Avoidance Group (AAG) charged with implementing the revenue authority’s
efforts to counteract abusive tax avoidance. According to HMRC, the AAG
will pursue this strategy by: quickly and expertly preventing and closing down
avoidance by effective legislation; engaging with taxpayers about how it will
address tax avoidance; knowing what avoidance schemes or bespoke
arrangements are being marketed and used; knowing which organisations and
individuals are more likely to carry out avoidance and organising its resources
accordingly; treating those who avoid their tax obligations as higher risk than
organisations and individuals who do not; being proactive at challenging
avoidance by investigation and effective litigation; and taking a strategic
approach in litigating avoidance cases. 135 For this purpose, moreover, the
AAG has developed the following list of risk factors that it considers to be
“signposts” of potentially abusive tax avoidance:
Transactions or arrangements which have little or no economic substance or
which have consequences not commensurate with the change in a taxpayer’s (or
group of related taxpayers’) economic position …
131 See, eg, V Braithwaite, “Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction” (2007) 20
Law & Policy 3 at 4-5.
132 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2006 Review of Links with Large Business (the “Varney
Review”), (November 2006), para 1.2, available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/large-
business/review-report.pdf.
133 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, above, n 132, para 1.2.
134 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, HMRC Approach to Compliance Risk Management for
Large Business (March 2007), para 1.4, available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2007/
large-business-riskman.pdf. See also HMRC, Making a Difference: Delivering the Review of
Links with Large Business (March 2007), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/
budget2007/large-business-plan07.pdf.
135 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Anti-Avoidance Group, Our Vision and Strategy,
available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/avoidance/vision-strategy.htm (accessed on
28 February 2009).
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Transactions or arrangements bearing little or no pre-tax profit which rely
wholly or substantially on anticipated tax reduction for significant post tax profit
…
Transactions or arrangements that result in a mismatch such as: between the
legal form or accounting treatment and the economic substance; or between the
tax treatment of different parties or entities; or between the tax treatment in
different jurisdictions …
Transactions or arrangements exhibiting little or no business, commercial or
non-tax driver …
Transactions or arrangements involving contrived, artificial, transitory, pre-
ordained or commercially unnecessary steps or transactions …
Transactions or arrangements where the income, gains, expenditure or losses
falling within the UK tax net are not proportionate to the economic activity
taking place or the value added in the UK – especially where the transactions or
arrangements are between associates within the same economic entity and
would not have occurred between parties acting at arm’s length and/or add no
value to the economic entity as a whole … [and] …
[T]ransactions or arrangements designed to sidestep the effect of [tax] legislation
[that is enacted to target particular transactions or arrangements and give them a
particular tax result], but which otherwise achieve the same result. 136
Similarly, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has developed a
comprehensive compliance program designed to counteract aggressive tax
planning, which it defines as “the use of transactions or arrangements that
have little or no economic substance and that are created predominantly to
obtain a tax benefit that is not intended by the law”. 137 Echoing the approach
of HMRC, the Commissioner has emphasised that the revenue authority
hopes to “create certainty through transparency and cooperation” with large
businesses, at the same time as it targets aggressive tax planning. 138 Consistent
with this approach, the ATO has entered into a number of Annual Compliance
Arrangements (ACAs) with large enterprises under which the enterprise must
develop a risk management plan and disclose information to the ATO, in
return for which the ATO agrees not to audit low-risk issues and to inform the
enterprise about issues that it considers to be high risk. 139 In the mid-1990s,
the ATO adopted a similar approach for administering its transfer pricing
rules, 140 negotiating Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) and targeting scarce
regulatory resources on high-risk enterprises – an approach that yielded a 32%
136 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Guidance from Anti-Avoidance Group, available at
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/avoidance/aag-risk-assessing.htm (accessed on 28 February
2009).
137 C Evans, above, n 11, p 16. For the most recent compliance program, see Australian
Taxation Office, Compliance Program 2008-09, available at http://www.ato.gov.au.
138 M D’Ascenzo, A New Dimension, Speech to the Corporate Tax Association Convention,
Sydney, 12 May 2008, available at http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/
content/00139238.htm (accessed 19 May 2009)
139 MD’Ascenzo,ANew Dimension, Corporate Tax Association Convention, Sydney, 12 May
2008, cited in C Evans, above, n 11, p 16.
140 J Braithwaite, above, n 3, pp 89-97.
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increase in tax payments from 1996 to 1997, despite a 5% reduction in
corporate income. 141 Not surprisingly, other jurisdictions have adopted a
similar approach, encouraging the negotiation of APAs for transfer pricing
purposes, 142 and devoting additional regulatory resources to the fight against
aggressive tax planning. 143
In addition to these domestic initiatives, revenue authorities have also
embarked on international joint initiatives, cooperating with other revenue
authorities to address tax avoidance arrangements involving more than one
jurisdiction. In 2002, for example, the OECD established a Forum for Tax
Administration (FTA), with a mandate to develop effective responses to
current administrative issues in a collaborative way, working with member and
non-member countries. At the third meeting of this Forum in September
2006, 35 Commissioners or Deputy Commissioners of Taxation from FTA
member countries signed the Seoul Declaration, stating that:
Each country differs in the level and structure of its taxes, but all countries –
both in low and high tax countries, developed and developing – agree that once
national tax laws have been enacted, they need to be enforced. Enforcement of
our respective tax laws has become more difficult as trade and capital
liberalisation and advances in communication technologies have opened the
global marketplace to a wider spectrum of taxpayers. While this more open
economic environment is good for business and global growth, it can lead to
structures which challenge tax rules, and schemes and arrangements by both
domestic and foreign taxpayers to facilitate non-compliance with our national
tax laws. It is our duty as heads of our respective countries’ revenue bodies to
ensure compliance with our national laws by all taxpayers, including activities
beyond our borders, through effective enforcement and by taking preventative
measures that deter non-compliance. 144
Subsequent work of the FTA has focused on the role of tax intermediaries,
culminating in a study published in 2008. 145 According to this report, while
some tax advisors play a major role designing and promoting abusive tax
avoidance schemes, it is overly simplistic to focus on the supply side as the
main response to aggressive tax planning. On the contrary, reflecting an
approach consistent with the idea of responsive regulation, the report
recommended that revenue authorities should “encourage large corporate
taxpayers to engage in a relationship with revenue bodies based on co-
141 J Braithwaite, above, n 3, p 93.
142 See, eg, Canada Revenue Agency, Information Circular 94-4R: “International Transfer
Pricing: Advance Pricing Arrangements (APAs)” (16 March 2001).
143 In Canada, for example, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) launched a major initiative
in 2004, increasing the audit rate for taxpayers considered to be high risk. See also
Finance Quebec, above, n 3, pp 25-26 (describing a central unit established by the
Quebec revenue authority to counteract aggressive tax planning).
144 OECD, Seoul Declaration, third meeting of the OECD Forum on Tax Administration,
Seoul, Korea, September 2006.
145 OECD, Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries (2008). For a brief summary of this report,
see L Wise, “OECD Study in to the Role of Tax Intermediaries”, in J Freedman, above,
n 5, p 185.
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operation and trust” 146 while simultaneously establishing “effective risk-
management processes … to identify [non-compliant] taxpayers and allocate
the necessary level of resources to deal with them”. 147
Another example of international cooperation in tax administration is the
formation of the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre (JITSIC)
in April 2004 through a Memorandum of Understanding among the revenue
authorities in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. 148
According to this document, the purpose of JITSIC is to:
Provide support to the parties through the identification and understanding of
abusive tax schemes and those who promote them.
Share expertise, best practices and experience in tax administration to combat
abusive tax schemes.
Exchange information on abusive tax schemes, in general, and on specific
schemes, their promoters, and investors consistent with the provisions of
bilateral tax conventions.
Enable the parties to better address abusive tax schemes promoted by firms and
individuals who operate without regard to national borders. 149
According to a press release announcing its formation, the initial focus of
JITSIC’s efforts will include “ways in which financial products are used in
abusive tax transactions by corporations and individuals to reduce their tax
liabilities, and the identification of promoters developing and marketing those
products and arrangements”. 150 More generally, according to then
Commissioner of the IRS Mark Everson, the establishment of JITSIC “sends
a strong, unmistakeable message to promoters who cross borders to cloak tax
schemes”. 151 As a result, it seems, while the FTA appears to have emphasised
cooperation with relatively compliant taxpayers at the bottom of regulatory
pyramid, JITSIC is aimed at non-compliant promoters and taxpayers at the
peak of the pyramid.
CONCLUSIONS
As tax avoidance activity has increased in recent decades, governments and
revenue authorities have been unwilling to permit the erosion of their tax
bases and the integrity of their tax systems, and have responded through
various legislative reforms and administrative initiatives to discourage this
146 OECD, above, n 145, p 5.
147 OECD, above, n 145, p 6.
148 Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre Memorandum of Understanding
(23 April 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=123016,
00.html.
149 Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre Memorandum of Understanding,
above, n 148.
150 Internal Revenue Service, Australia, Canada, UK and US Agree to Establish Joint Task Force,
IR-2004-61 (3 May 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=
123016,00.html.
151 Internal Revenue Service, above, n 150.
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phenomenon. By enacting new or enhanced disclosure rules, for example,
governments obtain “real-time intelligence” on abusive schemes that can be
used to formulate legislative responses and are better able to manage the risks
of aggressive tax planning by directing scarce regulatory resources to the
review of schemes and arrangements that are most likely to involve abusive tax
avoidance. Together with extended limitation periods and penalties on
taxpayers and promoters engaged in abusive tax avoidance, these disclosure
rules alter the risk/reward ratio for taxpayers and promoters engaged in
abusive tax avoidance, reducing both the demand for and the supply of
abusive tax avoidance schemes. Domestic and international initiatives adopting
a more flexible or responsive approach to the enforcement of tax obligations
can also be expected to lessen the incidence of abusive tax avoidance by
encouraging and rewarding taxpayers and advisors who comply with the letter
and spirit of a country’s tax laws and specifically targeting the least compliant
and highest-risk taxpayers and promoters.
Whether these measures are fully adequate to address the problem of tax
avoidance in the 21st century, however, remains uncertain. First, as I have
argued elsewhere, to the extent that legal standards governing the application
of general anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory GAARs are contested or
unclear, administrative guidelines may contradict the rule of law by establishing
“signposts” of abusive tax avoidance without clear legal authority. 152 For this
reason, effective and legitimate anti-avoidance measures may depend on the
presence of a statutory GAAR (which the UK has yet to adopt) and statutory
guidance on common forms of abusive tax avoidance (which is lacking in the
Canadian GAAR). Second, as suggested earlier, because the distinction
between unacceptable or abusive tax avoidance on the one hand and
acceptable tax planning or tax minimisation on the other depends on
legislative intent and the purpose of the relevant tax legislation, the effective
operation of a statutory GAAR is apt to depend on greater use of principles-
based drafting as well as SAARs to provide interpretative guidance. Finally, to
the extent that these interpretative guideposts are often lacking in the
international arena, where treaty shopping and international tax arbitrage
exploit inconsistencies and discontinuities between the tax systems of differing
jurisdictions and competitive pressures make it difficult for individual
jurisdictions to act alone, effective efforts to counteract international tax
avoidance are likely to demand greater legislative as well as administrative
coordination among different jurisdictions. Despite many measures to
discourage abusive tax avoidance, therefore, there is also much that remains to
be done.
152 DDuff, “Relationships, Boundaries, and Corporate Taxation: Compliance and Avoidance
in an Era of Globalisation”, in J Freedman, above, n 5, pp 197, 205. In the UK context,
on the other hand, HMRC’s AAG has provided judicial authority for each of the
“signposts” which it considers indicative of abusive tax avoidance.
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